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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5409
Land assets have become an important source of 
financing capital investments by subnational governments 
in developing countries. Land assets, often with billions 
of dollars per transaction, rival and sometimes surpass 
subnational borrowing or fiscal transfers for capital 
spending. While reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
future debt repayment capacity, the use of land-based 
revenues for financing infrastructure can entail substantial 
fiscal risks. Land sales often involve less transparency than 
borrowing. Many sales are conducted off-budget, which 
makes it easier to divert proceeds into operating budgets. 
This paper—a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to develop knowledge products on subnational finance and fiscal 
reforms. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. You may contact lliu@
worldbank.org for more information.  
Capital revenues from sales of land assets exert a much 
more volatile trend and could create an incentive to 
appropriate auction proceeds for financing the operating 
budget, particularly in times of budget shortfalls during 
economic downturns. Furthermore, land collateral and 
expected future land-value appreciation for bank loans 
can be linked with macroeconomic risks. It is critical 
to develop ex ante prudential rules comparable to those 
governing borrowing, to reduce fiscal risks and the 
contingent liabilities associated with the land-based 
revenues for financing infrastructure.  
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This paper addresses the integration of land financing into the broader fiscal management 
framework for subnational governments.  Land assets are an important ingredient of subnational 
government finance in most developing countries.  Land frequently is the most valuable asset on 
the asset side of subnational balance sheets.  Direct sales of land by subnational governments are 
the clearest example of “capital” land financing.  In addition, there are other instruments for 
converting public land rights to cash or infrastructure.  Land may be used as collateral for 
borrowing, a practice that has a long history of financing urban investment. Today, land often is 
the most important public contribution to public-private partnerships (PPP) that build metro 
(subway) lines, airports, or other large infrastructure projects. Beyond physical land, rights to 
more intensive land development—a higher Floor Space Index (FSI) or higher Floor Area Ratio 
(FAR)—may also be sold by public development agencies. These “excess density rights” in effect 
represent the publicly controlled share of privately owned land. The development rights have 
economic value that can be sold by public authorities, as has happened in Mumbai, Sao Paulo, 
and the United States. 
Unlike subnational government debt—the most prominent item on the liability side of the balance 
sheet—subnational governments’ management of land assets has been largely unregulated by 
higher-level authorities. Until recently, subnational governments in various developing countries 
typically have been free to sell land that they own, contribute it to public-private partnerships or 
public enterprises, lease occupancy or development rights to private parties, and otherwise use or 
dispose of it at their discretion. Table 1 summarizes several recent public land transactions in 
several developing countries. To provide a sense of scale, the revenue generated by land sale is 
compared with urban capital spending or the size of governmental borrowing to finance capital 
investment. Many of the reported land sales took place in 2006-2007. In retrospect, this can be 
seen to have marked a high point in land prices. Urban land values subsequently declined in 
various developing countries, but have recovered to new highs in parts of the developing world, 
especially Asia and parts of Latin America.  The magnitude of revenue generated by land 
financing points both to the financial importance of public land assets, and the risks likely to be 
associated with inefficient management or badly handled land transactions. 
The desirability of integrating land financing into the subnational fiscal management framework 
can be seen from several perspectives. First, the sheer size of land asset transactions points to the 
importance of regulatory guidelines. Second, land is a financially risky asset. Urban land values 
are highly volatile.  Publicly owned land is in limited or fixed supply; decisions about land 
disposition therefore are difficult, if not impossible, to undo, either for a specific land parcel or 
for public landholdings as a class. If land sales are relied on to finance a significant part of local 
budgets, this source of revenue can suddenly shrivel or disappear in the face of land market 
declines or exhaustion of public land supply. Commercial land development by public entities can 
be even more volatile. Third, subnational land assets presently occupy a regulatory gap in many 
existing intergovernmental fiscal frameworks. Intergovernmental rules govern most other sources 
of local revenue, establishing which taxes and user fees local governments can impose, and 
typically setting limits on tax rates. Since the late 1990s, regulatory frameworks for subnational 
government debt have been put in place in various developing countries. These limit the size of 
subnational government borrowing, and seek to reduce the risk exposure of local authorities in 
managing local debt. Subnational debt regulation has proved especially valuable in the present 
worldwide financial crisis. Subnational governments in various developing countries have 
behaved prudently in managing debt, due in large part to the intergovernmental framework rules 




Table 1: Magnitude of Land Financing: Selected Projects and Locations 
Location and Activity  Land Financing Amount 
and Use of Proceeds 
Comparative Magnitude 
of  Land Finance 
Cairo, Arab Rep. of 
Egypt:  Auction of desert 
land at urban fringe for 
new towns (May 2007, 
3100 hectares). Seller was 
national ministry. 
US$3.12 billion:  To be used to reimburse costs 
of internal infrastructure, to build connecting 
highway to Cairo Ring Road, and for general 
central govt. budget 
Proceeds from this one sale 
equaled 117 times total urban 
property tax collections in the 
country; equal to approximately 
10 percent of total national 
government revenue.   
Mumbai, India:  Auction 
of land in the city’s new 
financial center (January 
2006, November 2007, 




US$1.2 billion:  To be used primarily to finance 
projects in metropolitan regional transportation 
plan. Together with revenue from other land 
sales, is planned to finance the first phase of 
Mumbai metro system and 23-km bridge across 
the Mumbai harbor to the mainland. 
10 times MMRDA’s total capital 
spending in fiscal 2005; 3.5 times 
total value of municipal bonds 
issued by all local urban bodies 
and local utilities in India in the 
past decade. 
Hyderabad, India:  
Contribution to private 
consortium by Greater 
Hyderabad Municipal 
Corporation of land 
surrounding planned 
metro line and metro 
stations. 
According to contract agreement, (July 2008) a 
private company was to build the entire metro 
system in return for the land and concession 
rights, without cost to government.   Over the 
lifetime of operation the company would return 
an additional US$270 million (present value) to 
government. 
It appears (as of late 2009) that 
this arrangement has fallen 
through, victim of the decline in 
land values and reduced demand 
for land development. The private 
company has been unable to raise 
the equity and debt (total: US$2.5 
billion) necessary to build the 
metro. It missed payments on the 
construction bond. 
Istanbul, Turkey:  Sale of 
old municipal bus station 
and former government 
administrative building 
site (March-April, 2007). 
US$1.5 billion in auction proceeds, said by 
municipal and national governments to be 
dedicated to capital investment budget. 
Total Istanbul municipal capital 
spending in fiscal 2005 was 
US$994 million; municipal 
borrowing for infrastructure 
investment in 2005 was US$97 
million. 
Cape Town, South 
Africa:  sale of Victoria 
and Albert Waterfront 
property by Transnet, the 
parastatal transportation 
agency (November 2006). 
US$1.0 billion, to be used to recapitalize 
Transnet and support its investment in core 
transportation infrastructure.  Part of proceeds 
used to finance pension obligations, which in 
turn strengthened balance sheet and allowed 
Transnet to borrow from market without 
government guarantee or subsidy. 
Sale proceeds exceeded 
Transnet’s total capital spending 
in fiscal 2006; equal to 17 percent 
of five-year capital investment 
plan prepared in 2006. 
Warsaw, Poland Sale at 
auction of municipal land 
assets. 
Proceeds:  Actual 2007, 330 million zlotys 
(approx: US$110 million).  Budgeted 2009, 144 
million zlotys. Budgeted as capital revenue 
within the capital budget. 
Land sales in 2007 exceeded 
municipal borrowing by 
20percent.  Budgeted revenues 
from land sales in 2009 were 
70percent of budgeted borrowing 
by city. 
China subnational land 
leasing for financing 
large-scale urban 
infrastructure.  
According to the China Index Academy, the 
following cities led the way in land-leasing 
contract revenues in 2009: Hangzhou (105.4 
billion yuan), Shanghai (104.3 billion) and 
Beijing (92.8 billion). 
In Beijing’s case, land leasing 
contract value in 2009 was equal 
to 45percent of total fiscal 
revenue. 
Sources:  First five cases modified from Peterson (2009); information for Warsaw from Kaganova (2010) 
and Warsaw City (2010); information for China from Xinhua (2010). 3 
 
Higher-level governments in developing countries are just beginning to recognize the financial 
risks inherent in subnational land asset management, and beginning to integrate land financing 
into broader subnational fiscal management frameworks that reduce these risks. The current state 
of play may be compared to the initial efforts to construct regulatory frameworks for subnational 
debt fifteen years ago, when different approaches were being explored and before agreement was 
reached on many of the essential elements that should go into subnational debt regulation. 
Although land assets rival, and sometimes surpass, subnational borrowing in the amount of 
financing mobilized, the financial aspects of public land transactions typically lack coherent 
oversight in many developing countries. Land sales often involve less transparency than 
borrowing. Frequently, land sales are conducted off-budget, which would make it easier to use 
proceeds to finance operating expenses or for other non-investment purposes.  Non-competitive 
transfers of land assets to private firms, public-private ventures, or other subnational institutions 
raise questions about how the assets should be valued, and the potential squandering of 
government’s asset base.  Bank loans for financing infrastructure often are backed, directly or 
indirectly, by land collateral, creating the potential for systemic risk linking subnational debt to 
land markets. All of these factors make it critical to identify ex ante prudential rules, similar to 
those governing borrowing, to reduce the risks involved in land transactions and increase fiscal 
transparency. 
National governments have an interest in fiscally well-run subnational governments.  They can 
provide prudential rules that both point the way to better fiscal management and screen out 
excessive risks.  Poor fiscal management by subnational governments may create not only 
adverse consequences for themselves but also systemic fiscal risks.  Subnational defaults on debt, 
for example, may create pressure on national government to bail out the defaulting 
governments—placing sometimes acute burdens on national finances, as well as exposing the 
entire national credit market to higher risk ratings based on subnational performance.  Potential 
exposure to systemic risk has been a primary motivation for the adoption of rules-based 
regulation of subnational credit markets.  Typically, the rules limit the amount of debt that 
subnational governments can incur, and expressly disavow national-level bailouts of subnational 
credit defaults. 
The potential systemic risk posed by land asset bubbles has been exemplified by the case of Japan 
where the explosion of land values at the end of the 1980s and intensified bank lending to land 
and property developers were followed by collapse of the land asset value, which contributed to 
the lost decade of near zero growth in Japan (Shiratsuka 2003; Ito and Mishkin 2006; Borio, 
Furfine, and Lowe 2001).   Recognizing the systemic dangers that can be created by land asset 
bubbles, various developing countries have started reform efforts.  In some countries where the 
majority of urban land is held by subnational governments, these efforts have translated into a 
series of new rules affecting subnational land transactions.  China, for example, has begun to 
develop rules for subnational governments’ land asset disposition.
 1   
This paper deals with managing the fiscal risks of subnational land financing and transactions 
against the background of subnational borrowing regulation and the framework for managing 
subnational financial risks. It emphasizes ex ante prudential rules to reduce fiscal risks.  There are 
broader issues relating to land management which are outside the scope of this paper,
2 including 
                                                 
1 See “Report on the Work of Government,” Third Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, 
Beijing, China, adopted March 14, 2010,  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
03/15/content_13174348.htm.  People’s Online Daily 2010. 
2 Broader issues include the role of publicly owned land in spatial planning and urban development, the 
inter-relation between public land transactions and land market dynamics, resettlement and safeguard, 
coordination of land policy across different governmental and quasi-governmental institutions, as well as 
effective economic management of individual parcels of property owned by subnational governments.  We 4 
 
the political economy challenges, i.e., the potential lack of organized groups pushing for land 
regulation from a fiscal management perspective.  Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss how such a constituency could be mobilized, the politics of reforms needs to be 
recognized.  Although the paper does not address urban planning and urban land markets as such, 
one element of intelligent urban planning is recognition of the value of land in alternative uses, an 
issue which the report does address. One of the most important risks in public land management 
is that public sector entities either will ignore the market value of land in making land-use 
decisions or, at the other extreme, will act as profit-maximizing quasi-monopolists whose goal is 
simply to extract the greatest financial value from the land or development rights they control, 
potentially contributing to a land asset bubble. These institutional risks, and how to protect 
against them, are addressed.    
Many different government institutions can own or control urban land. It is typical of most 
developing and developed countries that control over public land is split among a large array of 
public agencies belonging to different levels of government. Individual municipalities often own 
sizable parcels of well-located land. Above the municipality, typically, are a variety of 
metropolitan-scale agencies, such as Urban Development Authorities, Housing Authorities, 
public infrastructure providers, and many others. These may be independent agencies, part of a 
consolidated metropolitan government, or arms of the state or national government.  Large urban 
land parcels may also be held by national-level agencies or public corporations, such as the 
Railways Authority, the Ports Authority, or the Airports Authority. These institutions come into 
play not merely because they hold important parcels of land, but because they often hold large 
“excess” land parcels not used for public service provision.  In federal or quasi-federal systems, 
state and provincial governments also can account for a large share of urban land holdings.  
Below the municipal level, land frequently is held by municipally owned enterprises or other 
subsidiary institutions, like utility companies. When these enterprises are not merely owned by 
the municipal government but effectively controlled by it, key land-use and land disposition 
decisions are made by the municipality. More often, local government enterprises have goals and 
decision-making processes of their own, which makes them at least partially autonomous and 
resistant to coordination. Perhaps the most common theme encountered in urban land asset 
management, as well as in metropolitan-scale urban planning and urban infrastructure financing, 
is the difficulty of coordinating plans and financing across these fragmented agencies. Each has 
its own budget, its own legal powers, its own mandate, and its own bureaucratic instinct for 
survival and growth. It is beyond the scope of this report to tackle the politics of metropolitan 
governance. However, some of the financial implications of institutional fragmentation for urban 
land management are discussed.   
The focus of this report is managing the fiscal risks of subnational land financing and 
transactions.  The paper brings together two tracks of work. A significant amount of work has 
been carried out on the appropriate regulatory frameworks for subnational borrowing and fiscal 
sustainability covering several developing countries (see Canuto and Liu, 2010; Liu and Waibel 
2008, 2009). A recent study of land financing of infrastructure investments has documented the 
large role that public land assets play in financing urban infrastructure in developing countries 
(Peterson 2009).  By bringing together these two tracks of work, the paper focuses on the fiscal 
and financial risks involved in land financing, and the regulatory framework for reducing such 
risks.   
                                                                                                                                                 
have focused on urban land in this report because of its significance as the most financially important land 
asset, and because in many developing countries subnational governments have ownership rights to urban 
public land that are more clearly defined than in rural areas.   5 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II examines the fiscal risks involved in land asset 
financing, and different policy approaches to dealing with these risks. Section III identifies the 
key elements of a regulatory framework for managing fiscal risks from land financing.  The 
section includes a comparison of emerging land-financing regulations with existing subnational 
debt regulation. Section IV draws upon the experience of both advanced countries and several 
developing countries in actually designing and implementing fiscal risk management for 
subnational land financing.  The review shows that design of the appropriate framework for risk 
management is a work-in-progress, but that different countries are wrestling with similar issues.   
Section V draws general conclusions for moving forward, both in policy design and research. 
II.  LAND FINANCING:  FISCAL RISKS AND POLICY ISSUES 
This section examines some of the specific financial risks and policy issues involved in using 
land transactions to finance subnational budgets. The regulatory framework that is emerging can 
reduce these risks and provide incentives for better management. It can: (i) prohibit or restrict 
actions that create inappropriate risk, (ii) prescribe actions that reduce risk or improve economic 
efficiency, and (iii) establish incentives that better align institutional behavior with desirable 
financial and economic outcomes. 
How Much Land Does Subnational Government Own?  How Much Does It Sell? 
Critical to the design of fiscal management frameworks is accurate information.  For land 
financing, the basic ingredients of an information system are the amount and value of land held 
by subnational governments, the extent of “surplus” land (i.e., land held by subnational 
institutions that is not required for public service delivery or other public use), the volume and 
value of public land sales, the prices at which land is being sold, and the budgetary use of land-
transfer proceeds.  This information is needed for effective financial management at the local 
level.  It is also a prerequisite for design of a subnational fiscal management framework and for 
monitoring compliance with framework rules. 
Information and transparent reporting of this kind are missing in many countries.  The lack of 
reliable information would make it difficult for higher-level authorities to identify current or 
potential fiscal risks that need to be addressed.  Specifically: 
  It is important to have reliable reporting for an urban area of total land sold, land prices, 
land-sale proceeds, or the use of proceeds.  The institutions holding land may do their 
transactions off-budget, and try to avoid transparent reporting.  Sometimes, they do this 
for fear of having to share revenue proceeds with other governmental institutions. 
  Many public authorities do not have adequate records of the land they own or control.  
Many have no institutional memory of their total landholdings. 
  It is a challenge to aggregate consistently subnational landholdings by key characteristics. 
  When comprehensive inventories are undertaken, they reveal surprisingly large amounts 
of land in public hands.  When land sales are aggregated across institutions, they also 
tend to be surprisingly large. 
In short, frameworks for managing the risks arising from land transactions need to be grounded 
with accurate data gathering.  The absence of comprehensive information heightens risk.  The 
situation may be compared to the early days of designing fiscal rules for managing subnational 
debt, when the very magnitude of debt issued by subnational institutions, as well as the terms of 
credits and the extent of subnational guarantees, were frequently unknown. 6 
 
 
How Should Publicly Owned Land Be Valued? 
For financial management, the economic or market value of property is fundamental to many 
decisions about land use, including the decision of whether or not to sell a land parcel, how to 
evaluate the public’s contribution of land to a joint venture or public enterprise, or how much 
land collateral should be pledged as security for a subnational government’s borrowing. All these 
activities have implications for fiscal risks and contingent liabilities.   
Despite the manifest advantages of knowing the value of publicly held land before making 
decisions about how it should be used, it is a practical challenge to systematically value public 
land. One issue is the cost of land-value appraisal. Another issue is the volatility of urban land 
prices, which can lead to steep fluctuations in reported subnational land values from one year to 
the next. A system that requires annual market valuation of all land assets would be difficult and 
expensive to implement, with relatively modest practical payoff, since few of these parcels will 
be sold or transferred in a given year, and many of the land parcels are dedicated to public service 
provision and therefore cannot be sold.
3 
Economic distortions resulting from the lack of information about land values can be 
compounded by deliberate national policies that assign zero or artificially low values to land 
owned by subnational governmental units as an incentive to certain types of economic 
development. 
A policy priority is to establish fair market prices for those land parcels that government has 
under consideration for disposition—through sale, contribution to public-private partnerships, 
transfer to subsidiary enterprises, or designation as surplus property. Countries have adopted 
alternative instruments for this kind of price discovery. On municipal governments’ contribution 
of public land to private infrastructure partnerships, Kuwait’s new land regulations require that 
any public land parcel considered for contribution to a PPP must be appraised by two independent 
specialized appraisal firms, whose valuation estimates are to be made public before any decision 
is made about a land transaction (Kuwait 2008).   Alternatively, some countries now require that 
public land be sold only through competitive auctions.  
                                                 
3 In Roman law, applicable to most of continental Europe, Mexico, South Africa, and a number of other 
countries, government-owned properties are divided into two major groups:  (1) those belonging to the 
“public domain,” which cannot be alienated (i.e., sold or mortgaged) without special prior legal approval; 
and also may have restrictions limiting them to public use, and (2) those belonging to the “private domain,” 
where publicly owned property is regulated similarly to privately owned property. In most other countries, 
specified legal steps are required to declare that property used for public service delivery “surplus” 
property, is no longer required for that purpose, and hence available for sale or alternative use. 
Box 1: Public Land Ownership 
The World Bank’s Urban Growth Management Initiative reports that publicly owned land 
accounts for more than half of total city territory in 19 percent of the cities in its sample, 
including Algiers, Moscow, and Singapore, and more than one-quarter of city territory in an 
additional 19 percent of cities, including Ho Chi Minh City, Istanbul, and Pusan. A partial 
inventory of publicly owned land in Chennai, India, conducted some years ago, found that 30 
percent of all land was owned by government institutions. At the metropolitan scale, the 
public share of land ownership is often greater. There is a regional pattern to public 
ownership of urban land in developing countries. The percentage is highest in Asia, Eastern 
and Central Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. It is lower in Latin America and North 
America. 
Sources:  Rajack (2007); Bertaud (2002). 7 
 
 
Volatility of Financing Capital Budgets 
Publicly owned urban land assets are in limited supply. Although urban authorities can acquire 
new land at the urban fringe, and under certain conditions can acquire land through condemnation 
or eminent domain, urban land cannot be “produced” indefinitely. Sale or leasing of public land is 
not a “recurring” source of revenue.  For this reason, revenues from the sale or other disposition 
of public land should be treated as one-time revenues, with proceeds used to finance investment 
in urban infrastructure assets or finance other one-time expenditures such as major institutional 
reforms.  In countries that have formal capital budgets, revenues from land sales typically are 
designated for budget purposes as capital revenues. They are used to finance activities eligible for 
spending under the capital budget, along with other sources of capital revenue such as borrowing 
and carryover of savings from the operating budget. The City of Warsaw, Poland, for example, 
following national financial reporting rules, shows the proceeds of all property sales, as well as 
the proceeds of land sales, on the revenue side of its capital budget (Warsaw City 2010). 
In moderation, the use of land-based revenues for capital finance should reduce overall capital 
financing risk. Land sales, upfront land leasing, and contributions of land to infrastructure joint 
ventures all generate revenue or assets up front. Land transactions of this kind complement other 
types of financing by reducing uncertainty about future financing sources.  When land finance 
substitutes for borrowing, it reduces the risk surrounding future debt repayment capacity and the 
need to generate future revenue streams to meet future debt service.   
Extreme reliance on land assets to finance urban capital budgets, however, creates risks of its 
own.  Urban land markets are highly volatile, especially in developing countries. Land prices can 
undergo swings of 50 percent in either direction, and in times of crisis even more, as 
demonstrated during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s (Mera and Bertaud 2000) and again 
during the market collapse starting in 2008. Demand for land development can collapse in 
volumes as well as in price. Volatile land prices and swings in developer demand for land 
conversion combine to create volatility and uncertainty in this source of capital finance. Box 3 
illustrates for Mumbai, India the effect that such volatility can have on capital budgets, when 
revenue from land asset sales or upfront land leasing is a main source of public infrastructure 
finance. 
Other examples of volatility abound.  Hong Kong, China between 1996 and 2000 raised via land 
leasing revenues an amount equal to 130 percent of its expenditures on public works and 18 
percent of its entire budget expenditures.  However, land prices and demand for land fell 
precipitously as a result of the Asian financial crisis, leading Hong Kong, China to suspend land 
leasing altogether between 2001 and 2003.  The loss of revenues from land leasing contributed to 
steep fiscal deficits that at their peak reached 30percent of fiscal revenues (Hong 2003; Peterson 
Box 2: South Africa’s Property Tax System 
South Africa has introduced a promising solution to the valuation of subnational property and, at the 
same time, a mechanism for making institutions that hold valuable public property feel the 
opportunity costs of continuing to hold such property.  Under South Africa’s Municipal Property 
Rates Act (implemented in 2005), public property is assessed at market value using the same 
valuation techniques that are used for assessing private property.  Public property owners also must 
pay property tax, following the same principles as private property owners.  Land is valued 
separately from improvements at market rate. 
Source:  Pillay, Tomlinson, and DuToit (2006). 8 
 
2007).  In Warsaw, Poland, proceeds from municipal land auctions fell from 329.6 million PLN 
in 2007 to 1.2 million through the first 10 months of 2009 (Kaganova 2010). 
 
Land as Collateral for Subnational Borrowing 
During the high-growth period of urban development, publicly owned land often has been used as 
collateral for borrowing to finance subnational public investment. The expectation that land 
values will increase with urban growth has made land an attractive asset for loan collateral, both 
for public borrowers and private lenders. However, this practice magnifies the risks related to 
borrowing, as land values decline in periods of economic stress, when it is most difficult to 
finance loan repayments. In many cases, not only subnational governments but also their 
enterprises have borrowed using property under their control as collateral.  There is a potential for 
heightened systemic risk when the entire subnational sector relies heavily on land and land values 
to provide security for subnational borrowing.  Box 4 illustrates the historical use of land-based 
municipal borrowing to finance the re-building of Paris in the 19
th century, and the risks that 
eventually triggered a financial crisis that impacted the national finance system. It also 
summarizes China’s use of subnational borrowing against anticipated land-value gains to finance 
major urban highway projects—a practice that the national government now has prohibited by 
regulation in order to limit subnational fiscal risks. 
 
Box 3: Volatility of Land-Asset Revenues and Capital Spending 
Mumbai, India has adopted a long-term urban development plan. The anchor infrastructure projects 
in this plan are a new metro rail system and a 23-km bridge over open water connecting the island 
city of Mumbai to the mainland peninsula to the east, where a concentration of industrial Special 
Economic Zones is being constructed. The most recent financing plans for these projects called for 
both to be financed primarily from the proceeds of land sales received by the Mumbai Metropolitan 
Regional Development Authority (MMRDA). The vast majority of MMRDA’s land sale revenue 
comes from sale of land at its Bandra-Kurla financial complex. The table below shows how steeply 
demand and land prices have fluctuated at Bandra-Kurla. As a result, no private bidders responded 
in January 2009 to the government’s tender for bids to build the trans-harbor bridge. 
 
Land Sales by MMRDA at Bandra-Kurla Complex 
  Year and Use     Price  per  Square  Meter  
 
1993   Rs.30,000 
 
1995  (Diamond  Bourse)     Rs.42,500 
 
1998-2000      Sales  suspended because of Asian 
      financial  crisis 
 
Late  2000  (Citibank)     Rs.86,000 
 
January 2006 (convention center)      Rs.153,000 
 
November 2007 (commercial complex)    Rs.504,000 
 
Late  2008      Failed  auction 
Sales suspended because of the 
global financial crisis 




Land and infrastructure often are the ultimate collateral supporting debt to finance publicly 
sponsored development projects.  Experience has demonstrated that the risks in this arrangement 
require special regulations.  When the State of California (United States) adopted Proposition 13, 
it essentially froze local property tax assessments and property tax rates, limiting local 
governments’ borrowing power.  Other laws directly restricted local debt issuance.  As a result, 
public authorities looked for ways to shift to private developers (and ultimately homebuyers) the 
costs of infrastructure investment for new residential subdivisions.  One instrument was Mello-
Roos bonds, which allowed private developers to borrow against land values and the anticipated 
revenue stream that would materialize when the subdivision was sold out.  Private developers 
were allowed to add the amounts necessary for debt repayment as a separate item in the public 
property tax bill.  In recognition of the potential fiscal risk, from both declining land values and 
the failure to complete or sell out development projects, special regulations were put in place 
limiting the amount of infrastructure debt developers could issue to one-third the appraised value 
of land.  Even so, Mello-Roos bonds have had much higher default rates than local government 
bonds issued to finance the same types of infrastructure, and have been flagged as risky 
instruments by the credit rating agencies. 
Diversion of Land-Sale Proceeds to the Operating Budget 
One of the greatest potential risks to subnational finances is that the proceeds from the sale of 
land or other assets owned by subnational governments will be used to finance recurring 
operating expenditures. This practice can build an unsustainable level of current spending, and 
place the subnational government unit at risk when it has to cope with a budget shortfall once 
asset sales are exhausted. It also depletes wealth that should benefit more than the current 
generation. 
Box 4: Risks of Land as Loan Collateral 
 
Baron Haussmann’s reconstruction of Paris,  France in the 19
th century was one of the largest urban 
redevelopment programs ever undertaken. Two-thirds of the costs were borne by the municipal government, 
via budgetary contributions, land sales, and borrowing. Haussmann acquired huge swathes of land through 
condemnation and expropriation at current-use value or less. After construction of grand boulevards and 
installation of infrastructure lines, excess abutting land was sold to private promoters at prices greatly 
enhanced by the public works. Land sales by the municipality were used to repay the borrowing used to 
finance construction. 
 
For more than 15 years, this process worked successfully to finance massive urban investment.  In the end, 
however, it revealed two types of risks that undermined the scheme. First, the courts eventually ruled that the 
municipality could not capture all of the land-price gain resulting from public improvements. Much of this 
gain had to be shared with the original landowners. This impaired the municipality’s ability to finance 
investment from public land profits. Second, most of the investment activity and borrowing was conducted 
off-budget, unknown to the municipal council and without public oversight. When the rules regarding 
landowner compensation were changed, the city had to default on many of its debt obligations, precipitating a 
crisis throughout the entire French financial sector. 
 
In urban China during the 1990s and early 2000s, one of the most used forms of financing for major 
infrastructure projects was to borrow against the future anticipated value of land after infrastructure was 
installed. For example, the city of Changsha (Hunan Province) contributed undeveloped land on both sides of 
a proposed ring road to the municipal-owned Ring Road Corporation.  In its existing condition, without 
infrastructure or road access, the market value of most of this land was very limited. However, the 
Corporation was able to borrow US$350 million from China Development Bank and commercial banks for 
highway construction, based on the projected value that the land would have after completion of the ring 
road. Borrowing that is based on the future appreciation of land values is particularly risky, given the history 
of land market fluctuations in China and elsewhere, as well as the risk of project completion. One of the first 
steps that the government of China took in limiting the risk of subnational debt (in 2003) was to require that 
banks making loans to municipalities appraise land collateral at its current market value rather than at its 
projected value after the completion of infrastructure investment.                              
Sources: Peterson (2009); Peterson (2006)10 
 
This risk is high if subnational budgeting systems do not separate capital revenues from current 
revenues and do not restrict the use of revenues from land and property sales. A parallel risk 
arises when land transactions are conducted by subnational governments and public enterprises 
off-budget. Revenues are not reported through the formal budget system.  A subnational 
institution may have greater incentive to conduct off-budget transactions when it should share 
most or all of its revenue from land sales with a higher-level or general-purpose government. In 
this case, the subnational institution has an incentive to treat land sales, and other revenue-
producing land deals, off-budget, so that they do not have to be reported to higher-level 
government. One way of shifting land off budget to avoid revenue sharing has been to transfer 
property to subnational enterprises and to conduct property transactions through them. 
There are a number of ways to mitigate the risk that land sale revenues will be funneled into 
operating budgets.  Regulatory and accounting requirements that such revenues be treated as 
capital revenues within the capital budget provide the most straightforward solution in countries 
that have separate operating and capital budgets.  As part of the capital budget, revenues can be 
used for public investment but also for financing one-time budgetary structural reforms.  Another 
option involves regulatory earmarking of such revenues for capital investment.  For example, 
national law in Ethiopia requires that 90 percent of municipal urban land sale revenue be used for 
financing infrastructure investment.   
Recurring revenues from land owned by subnational authorities may appropriately be allocated to 
subnational operating budgets.  In cases where public authorities develop commercial or 
industrial projects on public land, for example, development costs can be recaptured through 
annual rental charges and used to finance debt service through the operating budget.  For 
economic efficiency and fiscal prudence, it is essential in these cases that all parts of a public 
development project, including land, be valued at market prices, and that the decision whether to 
publicly develop a site, sell land to the private sector for private development, or hold land in the 
public domain for future development and future increases in land value be made taking into 
account realistic market valuations. 
Institutional and Behavioral Issues 
To this point, we have considered specific financial risks associated with land financing and the 
management of public land assets. On the ground, a common complaint lodged against public use 
of land financing tends to be institutional and behavioral. Although these issues are beyond the 
scope of this paper, they deserve mention.  Individual officials and public institutions can create 
large land-value gains through their actions.  Large sums of money pass through their hands, 
largely off-budget and off-balance sheet, when land transfers are consummated. This mode of 
operation invites abuse and corruption. Even when corruption is not involved, the institution that 
sells land is likely to try to keep the proceeds within its agency and may use them for such 
purposes as new office buildings for agency employees. The belief that revenue generated from 
public land sales can be misused, wasted, or corruptly diverted has contributed to the public 
resistance land sales have encountered when proposed as a financing strategy for urban 
development in places ranging from the United States to urban India.  
In countries where municipal governments have full control over urban land, there is a fiscal 
incentive for governments to act like profit-maximizing land monopolists, by acquiring as much 
land as possible as cheaply as possible at the urban fringe, converting it into municipally owned 
urban land, and selling the land or land-use rights to developers at the highest price the market 
will bear. Altschuler and Gomez-Ibanez (1993) long ago called attention to the fiscal incentives 
embedded in land-use controls in the United States. The tactics of some Chinese municipalities in 
acquiring land at the urban fringe and stockpiling it for future financial use have prompted the 
national government to impose several important regulatory restrictions.  These include new 11 
 
compensation standards for municipal acquisition of rural land, and strict enforcement of 
regulations prohibiting municipalities from stockpiling excess land by designating it for future 
industrial development zones, without explicit higher-level authorization.  
III.  TOWARD A SUBNATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
This section outlines the basic elements of a framework for regulating the fiscal and budgetary 
risks associated with subnational land financing and land transactions. We look at the parallels 
between subnational debt regulation and land asset regulation, to see if a similar approach can be 
employed in designing the regulatory framework.  
Integrating the fiscal aspects of land financing into the subnational fiscal management framework 
fits within a broader context. Land financing is part of land asset management, which in turn is 
part of more comprehensive government property management.  Government property 
management, including government buildings and infrastructure, manages public assets so as to 
improve economic efficiency in both the public and private sectors. Where systemic risk from 
land price bubbles is a factor, fiscal controls over subnational governments may have to be 
complemented with other macroeconomic initiatives, such as regulations on lending for land 
transactions by financial institutions.   
It needs to be emphasized that there is no single set of “best practices” or “model frameworks” 
that apply to all countries. Several of the risks discussed in this paper can be tackled in different 
ways.  Policies of land asset regulation need to be consistent with the institutions and 
intergovernmental relations that each country has developed. A national regulatory framework 
needs to be carefully designed so that it does not demand of subnational governments more 
sophisticated performance than they can reasonably deliver. If there is a common failing in the 
frameworks now in effect in developing countries, it is that they require unrealistically high 
standards of performance in some aspects of land asset regulation, while providing no guidance 
on other critical matters. 
Comparison with Regulatory Frameworks for Subnational Debt  
From a balance-sheet perspective, there is a parallel between subnational debt on the liability side 
of the balance sheet and publicly held land assets on the asset side of the balance sheet. It is 
instructive therefore to compare the regulatory framework that has evolved for subnational debt 
management since the late 1990s in developing countries with the framework that is beginning to 
emerge for subnational land asset management. The comparison addresses primarily financial 
management of land assets and land transactions.   
National regulation of subnational debt has been motivated in large degree by the fear that 
excessive borrowing at the subnational level can place national fiscal management at risk, 
because of the expectation that the national budget would be used to bail out subnational debt 
obligations in the event of default.  This risk has been greatest in federal systems, where states 
have independent borrowing authority, or in highly decentralized fiscal systems, where state and 
local governments are responsible for the bulk of infrastructure investment and can issue their 
own debt.  In these cases, subnational borrowing can take place on a scale that, if not prudently 
managed, can place national fiscal stability at risk.  Subnational fiscal imprudence in countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, and Russia contributed to the macroeconomic 
deteriorations there in the 1990s (Liu and Waibel, 2008). 
Subnational debt regulations have sought to impose prudential limits on borrowing, and often 
have sought to separate national liabilities from subnational liabilities by expressly stating that the 
national government will not assume responsibility for debt servicing in the event of subnational 12 
 
default.  At the same time, subnational debt regulation has the intent of supporting subnational 
fiscal stability.  One type of the new generation of fiscal controls often calls for budgetary 
intervention by higher-level governments when a subnational government defaults or is in danger 
of defaulting (Canuto and Liu, 2010a; Liu and Waibel, 2009).  The framework for subnational 
debt regulation is part of a broader regulatory framework designed to discourage excessive risk-
taking at the subnational level, and to encourage prudent fiscal management. 
In the case of fiscal risks associated with land asset management, most attention has been devoted 
to establishing rules that require or help subnational units to manage their own financial dealings 
more prudently.  Although the risks involved in poor subnational land asset management have on 
occasion escalated into national financial crises, these instances are relatively uncommon and 
most often have been associated with excessive debt taken on to finance public land development.  
Nonetheless local land asset management does have fiscal spillovers at the national level.  Given 
their financial significance, if public land assets are not managed responsibly, they place pressure 
on national governments to finance local infrastructure investment through intergovernmental 
grants and subsidies.  The countries that have taken the lead in intergovernmental land 
management, like Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, have done so with the explicit 
recognition that subnational authorities (and the national government itself) must do more to 
realize the financial value of property assets, in order to reduce reliance on taxes and borrowing 
to finance infrastructure investment. 
Recent worldwide experience has highlighted the potential of systemic risks deriving from land 
and property price bubbles.  In countries where the bulk of urban land is owned by subnational 
governments, national authorities have focused increasing attention on framework rules that set 
prudential limits regarding the operations of subnational governments in land transactions.  China 
has been a leader in this regard, as it seeks to sustain rapid economic growth, supported by 
moderately expansive credit policies, without triggering land and property price bubbles. 
Since the late 1990s, various developing countries have moved toward national frameworks 
regulating subnational debt.  Rules-based regulation of subnational debt markets has helped 
enhance the stability of these markets, and reducing the danger that subnational debt crises will 
escalate into national fiscal crises (Canuto and Liu 2010).  Table 2 outlines the structure of a 
prototypical framework for subnational debt regulation, and considers the analogous rules that 
might apply to the management of fiscal risks from subnational land financing. Given that this is 
the first attempt to explore such an analogy, we focus on main conceptual elements only, without 
dwelling on technical details.  The purpose of the exercise is to explore the potential, and 




Table 2: Comparison of Regulatory Frameworks -- Key Elements 
Regulation on Borrowing Rationale/Comment  Applicability to Land Assets 
Purpose of Borrowing 
Long-term borrowing—i.e., 
borrowing for other than cash 
flow management within a fiscal 
year—must be used for capital 
investment. 
This is the most universal 
regulation.  It reflects the 
basic ‘golden rule’ of macro 
finance, that debt should be 
used for capital formation or 
other expenditures that fit 
appropriately within a 
capital budget. 
A parallel rule would apply to land 
sales, with similar rationale. Asset 
sale proceeds must be used to finance 
capital expenditure, finance similar 
investments, or one-time budgetary 
expenditure reforms. 
Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Local governments are 
prohibited from borrowing in 
foreign currency unless it is 
approved by the central 
government, meet debt 
limitation rules, and/or 
guaranteed by the central 
government.  
Not universal, but a 
common prohibition.  
Rationale is that local 
governments do not earn 
foreign exchange, and 
therefore have no control 
over their ability to repay 
debt denominated in foreign 
currency.  This also reflects 
the disastrous experience 
that many countries 
previously had with foreign 
currency debt at the 
subnational level (Mexico, 
Argentina, Russia, etc.) 
A partial parallel exists regarding 
international capital flows.  Many 
countries have identified these flows 
as the driving force behind rapid land 
price increases.  Flows from oil-rich 
nations accounted for part of the very 
rapid increase of land values in 
Egypt, Turkey, South Africa and 
elsewhere.  A number of developing 
countries have imposed limitations 
on foreign investment in land and 
property, in an attempt to limit the 
volatility of land markets and reduce 
their exposure to land price bubbles.   
Fiscal Targets 
A debt ceiling is prescribed in 
law. This ceiling may be 
expressed in terms of the stock 
of debt, relative to subnational 
budget revenue or subnational 
GDP, or in terms of the debt 
service ratio (debt 
service/revenue), or both. 
This is nearly universal.  It 
is intended to 
reduce/eliminate the risk 
that a subnational 
government will borrow 
more than it can repay.  It 
provides a shorthand 
measure of debt capacity. 
A partial parallel exists on the asset 
side of the balance sheet.  It concerns 
“excessive” asset sales, or asset 
stripping to generate short-term 
revenue.  Regulations may require 
local authorities to certify that land 
(or other assets proposed for sale or 
transfer) is not needed for public 
purposes.  
Supply Side Regulations 
Banking regulations often 
require that banks maintain risk-
adjusted capital ratios for 
different types of loans, where 
the capital ratio depends on the 
credit rating of a subnational 
government or the central bank’s 
mandated capital ratios for 
different types of loans, 
reflecting risk assessment. 
The regulation is intended to 
protect the banking or 
financial sector from risky 
lending, by lowering credit 
leverage as credit risk 
increases. 
Loans or bonds backed by land 
collateral may require special 
regulation, due to land price volatility 
and the dependence of land values on 
the completion of major 
infrastructure or development 
projects.  Such rules could set 
minimum collateral/loan ratios for 
land-backed loans, and prescribe that 
for collateral purposes land must be 
valued at current market value.  14 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Regulatory Frameworks: Key Elements (Continued) 
Regulation on Borrowing Rationale/Comment  Applicability to Land Assets 
Contingent Liabilities & 
Inventories 
Regulations require that 
subnational government 
guarantees of third-party loans 
(e.g., subnational enterprises) be 
counted as debt for debt ceiling 
purposes, either at full value or 
risk-adjusted.  This in turn 
requires a comprehensive 
inventory of subnational 
guarantees, as well as all of the 
different types of debt that a 
municipality and its constituent 
elements have incurred. 
In practice, this “inventory” 
of subnational debt 
obligations and guarantees 
has been one of the most 
difficult challenges.  Until 
an inventory is undertaken, 
there typically is no 
comprehensive 
understanding of 
subnational aggregate debt 
obligations. 
A closely parallel situation arises in 
managing subnational land finance.  
An accurate accounting and reporting 
of subnational land transactions and 
land ownership is necessary to 
understand the potential risks.  
Similar to loan guarantees, land may 
be transferred to or from third parties 
in non-transparent ways that entangle 
and obscure financial reality. 
Fiscal Transparency 
Subnational borrowing should be 
brought on budget, preferably 
through a separate capital budget 
that spells out capital revenue 
sources and investment 
expenditures.  Outstanding debt 
obligations should be spelled out 
on the liability side of the local 
government balance sheet, or in 
equivalent notes.  Budgets, 
financial statements, and balance 
sheets should be publicly 
reported. 
 
Transparency of this kind is 
necessary to reduce private 
financial dealings and 
corruption, and to build the 
basis of fiscal 
accountability, both 
‘downward’ to citizens and 
‘upward’ to higher-level 
governments.  Off-budget 
transactions can obscure 
financial reality. 
Bringing land transactions on-budget 
is a critical part of regulation in this 
area.  All information on public land 
inventories, public land valuations, 
land sales, and land contributions to 
public-private joint ventures or 
subsidiaries should be conducted 
through transparent instruments, be 
reflected in the budget and financial 
statements of either the subnational 
government or of the special purpose 
vehicle serving as the financing 
instrument, and be a matter of public 
record. 
Collateral Restrictions 
Regulations commonly identify 
public-purpose property that 
cannot be offered as collateral 
for subnational borrowing.  A 
Pledge Law commonly requires 
registration of all property 
pledged as collateral so as to 
protect against “double 
pledging.” 
The purpose of the first 
regulation is to prohibit a 
lender from foreclosing on 
property that is essential to 
service delivery or the 
performance of basic 
government responsibilities. 
Exactly parallel.  In fact, the same 
law typically identifies what types of 
publicly owned property can and 
cannot be alienated, either by sale or 
as collateral for loans.  The 
registration of land and property 
collateral for land-management 
purposes involves exactly the same 
information required for subnational 
debt regulation. 
Sources: Liu and Waibel (2008, 2009) on subnational debt regulation, authors’ own research. 
Additional similarities exist between other aspects of Debt Management Policy and Land Asset 





Table 3: Policy Parallels between Subnational Debt Management and  
Land Asset Management from a Fiscal Risk Perspective 
Policy on Borrowing  Rationale/Comment  Applicability to Land Assets 
Limiting or prohibiting 
subnational  guarantees of 
third-party loans. 
Restrictions on lending 
from one public entity to 
another. 
Recognizes that there is an incentive 
for risky borrowers to seek 
subnational guarantees, and for inter-
related public entities to support one 
another in ways that violate arm’s-
length standards. Rules may prohibit 
private companies from getting such 
guarantees, limit the scope of 
guarantees for subnational 
enterprises, or require full accounting 
of such debt in debt ceilings. 
Parallel involves prohibition on 
the transfer of surplus land to 
other government units or 
enterprises, private developers, or 
public-private partnerships, 
except on a fully disclosed 
contractual basis.  Land values 
should be disclosed as part of this 
reporting.   
Establishing “trusts” that 
receive the receipts of bond 
sales, bank loans.  
Proceeds are dedicated by 
law to infrastructure 
investment (or specified 
investment projects).  A 
legal trustee is responsible 
for seeing that funds are 
not diverted. 
Intended to serve two purposes: (i) 
that proceeds from borrowing are not 
used for unauthorized purposes, (ii) 
the same trust, or a separate one, may 
collect revenues earmarked for debt 
repayment, to ensure that revenues 
are collected per debt covenant and 
are available exclusively for debt 
servicing.  These trusts have been an 
important element in establishing 
subnational creditworthiness in some 
countries. 
A parallel policy argument may 
apply.  A land trust (as 
recommended for Egypt, or found 
in some US states) could receive 
land sale proceeds, and ensure 
that proceeds are used for 
infrastructure investment as 
prescribed by law. 
Market pricing of 
borrowing.  There is a 
policy argument for having 
creditworthy subnationals 
borrow at the true, market 
cost of capital.  There are 
counter-arguments for 
subsidizing loans under 
some conditions. 
This issue has been the subject of 
continuing policy debate.  However, 
it is generally agreed that significant 
movement toward market pricing of 
municipal and state/provincial debt 
would be economically efficient, at 
least for those municipalities that are 
creditworthy. 
Very closely parallel.  If anything, 
the argument for market pricing 
of land is even stronger—though 
there are counter arguments for 
incorporating subsidies under 
certain conditions.  Clarifying 
guidelines identifying the specific 
situations in which below-market 
land pricing is permissible would 
be  helpful.   
Competition.  One 
important policy is that a 
competitive market should 
be established on the 
lending side, to ensure the 
lowest cost, sustainable 
availability of credit.  This 
means opening access on 
equal terms to bank 
lending and bond issuance, 
prohibiting monopolies of 
‘municipal or 
provincial/state banks,’ etc. 
This has been a tough challenge.  The 
primary experience coming out of 
Europe and many developing 
countries has been to have a 
specialized municipal or 
provincial/state lending bank with 
monopoly lending rights, often tied 
to allocation of grants/subsidies for 
infrastructure projects. 
Competition in this case means 
encouraging equal market access 
to all potential buyers of land, 
mandating auctions with adequate 
public advertising or similar 
competitive procedures for 
disposing of land assets, ensuring 
that these are administered to 
encourage open access, etc. In 
some countries, state-owned 
enterprises have been alleged to 
have unfair advantages in bidding 
for land.  Restrictions on their 
participation in auctions have 
been adopted. 
The above review suggests a useful parallel between subnational debt regulation and national 
oversight, or subnationals’ own regulation, of fiscal risks relating to subnational land transactions.  16 
 
The introduction of a regulatory framework for subnational debt management can serve as a 
useful precedent for introducing a regulatory framework for managing fiscal risks associated with 
land transactions.  However, the analogy should not be pushed too far.  The national 
government’s own fiscal condition is likely to be placed at greater risk by exposure to 
uncontrolled subnational borrowing.  The case for intergovernmental regulation of land or 
property asset management rests more on the support it gives to sound fiscal management at the 
subnational level, and the consequent relief of demand for grants from the national budget to 
finance basic infrastructure.  The emerging understanding of the dangers that “land price bubbles” 
can pose for macroeconomic management is an exception to this generalization.  In countries 
where subnational governments are the primary holders of urban land, fiscal and monetary 
management to avoid land price bubbles necessarily carries over to the framework for managing 
subnational land finance.  
IV.   CURRENT AND EMERGING PRACTICES FOR MANAGING THE 
FISCAL RISKS OF SUBNATIONAL LAND FINANCE 
Another way to approach the preparation of guidelines for regulation of fiscal risks from 
subnational land finance is to examine current practice, ranging from advanced countries to 
relatively low-income developing countries. So far, little has been compiled comparatively about 
the actual rules governing the financial aspects of land asset management across different 
countries. In an attempt to start filling this void, the authors have taken stock of actual land asset 
regulations applicable to subnational governments in the following areas: inventories of publicly 
owned land, valuation of land parcels, reporting of land transactions, competitive land market 
disposition, use of funds for capital earmarking, and land as collateral for borrowing including 
risks from potential land asset bubbles. These areas provide a basis from which to develop 
regulations of fiscal risks from land related financing.    
We assembled comprehensive information in these areas for four countries in our sample: 
Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and the United Kingdom.
4  The mix of these four countries covers 
a critically important case of governments that have a high level of discretion regarding municipal 
property, albeit from two countries that differ on the scale of development: Kyrgyzstan and the 
United Kingdom. In particular, in Kyrgyzstan, municipal borrowing does not exist yet (though it 
is permitted by law), but there is a high level of decentralization of public land and land 
management.  In the United Kingdom, though it has a centralized government, local authorities 
own substantial property portfolios and exercise a high level of discretion over them, but must 
work within one of the world’s most advanced and quickly evolving regulatory frameworks. 
Indonesia has decentralized both financial management and property asset management, along 
with other responsibilities as part of its decentralization since the early 2000s. Serbia is still in the 
early stages of government decentralization, and property assets are controlled by the central 
government to a large extent.    
Original research in these four countries was complemented by a desk review of the evolving 
regulatory frameworks in several other countries, including China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, and 
Kuwait, as well as the current regulatory frameworks at the national level in Australia and 
Canada, which are acknowledged leaders in public asset management. 
Below we provide a summary of current regulatory practice, and recent changes in practice, for 
several of the major areas of fiscal risk highlighted in Section II and in Section III’s comparison 
                                                 
4 This work was with the participation of local professional colleagues. After the framework results are 
published, we hope others will collect data on more countries to further accumulate empirical information 
on the subject. 17 
 
between the regulation of fiscal risks from subnational land-asset and the regulation of 
subnational debt. 
Inventories of Publicly Owned Land  
Every country that we examined requires that local governments prepare inventories of publicly 
owned land and other property. The problem lies not in the desirability of the standards written 
into higher-level regulation, but in the practical fact that subnational governments may not have 
the capacity and incentives to meet the regulatory standard. Moreover, national governments, 
while requiring regulatory compliance of subnationals, often do not themselves follow adequate 
inventorying procedures. In the United States, for example, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) has assessed national land-asset management as a “high risk” area beset by 
information gaps and non-compatible reporting (GAO 2006, 2007).   
As an example of a country-specific approach to subnational land inventories, new regulations in 
Indonesia (Government Regulation Number 6 of 2006), require that every government-owned 
asset at the local level must be recorded, inventoried, and reported from users to the local 
government’s asset manager. The local asset manager is supposed to be the common point of all 
asset management for the local government. This law is reported to have improved municipal 
performance in land inventorying, such that basic information on public ownership, location, and 
parcel dimensions is now generally recorded.
5 
Valuation of Land Parcels 
Many of the important financial decisions about land assets hinge on the market value of land.  
Historically, recording values of public land assets has been an accounting task. Until recently, 
the common public accounting practice throughout the world has involved recording land at 
acquisition (historic) cost.  This is true in the majority of developed and developing countries, 
including all three developing countries in our detailed sample, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Serbia. In many transitional countries, this accounting practice leads to the assignment of zero 
value for land owned by subnational governments, because land was transferred to local 
governments from the central government as part of decentralization, without charge.  
Even in Canada, which has been one of the world leaders in land asset management, accounting 
standards call for recording land at historic cost, though authorities recognize this is not the value 
relevant to land management decisions. Some of the few exceptions to this accounting convention 
are Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom where most of subnational property assets 
are recorded at one or another form of market value.   
The weakness of an accounting system that assigns no value to important land parcels is clear: 
property may be disposed of at any price, or given away to favored parties, without ever 
recording a transaction loss. On the other hand, market-based valuations have generated other 
concerns and contributed to an ongoing debate: if public-use land is not intended to be sold, why 
should it be recorded at market value?    
Recognition of the underlying issue—that traditional public sector financial and budgeting 
systems are not well suited to the needs of public asset management—is expressed in a special 
British report on public asset management, which became an internationally recognized document 
(Audit Commission 2000).  Reduction of systemic risk requires a system of land “valuation-for-
management,” independent from financial accounting valuation in cases where the latter is not 
based on market values. Such valuation should be promoted as a matter of either law or policy 
                                                 
5 However, the information is not in the form of a searchable database. 18 
 
and incentives, at least for the most valuable categories of land and before any transactions occur, 
including transactions between governmental entities. 
In practical terms, many countries are moving toward this goal of assigning market value 
estimates for management purposes to significant land parcels for which land-use decisions must 
be made. The types of situations that trigger these market valuations differ from country to 
country. In Kuwait, the policy debate surrounded the contribution of subnational land to private 
developers or public-private partnerships, sometimes in return for constructing development-level 
infrastructure. In response, regulations were promulgated that require dual independent appraisals 
of market value to be obtained and published before any decision about the contribution of land to 
a PPP is made. In South Africa, all government-owned land is assessed at market value for 
property tax purposes, with special emphasis on land used by infrastructure providers.  The policy 
purpose behind this practice is to ensure that public providers of infrastructure services pay the 
same property taxes as private providers, in order to maintain an even playing field. Hungary has 
recognized the fundamental distortion created by assigning zero value to subnational government 
land, as a result of the transfer free of cost of public land from the central level.  In 2000, there 
was a compulsory revaluation of municipal land in Hungary (Peteri 2009). As a result, land 
originally transferred by the central government and carried on the books at zero cost was 
assigned approximate market value. The goal of revaluation was to introduce economic factors 
into municipal land-use and development decisions, as well as to make municipal balance sheets 
more reflective of financial reality. 
Auctions provide an additional instrument of price discovery. If the decision has been made to 
sell a land parcel, the subnational government can move directly to auction and let the market 
reveal the price.  However, even in these cases, a prior market appraisal is appropriate.  This 
information can be used to establish a threshold auction price, and to decide whether it is in the 
municipality’s interest to dispose of a parcel. 
Reporting of Land Transactions 
A lack of transparency and reporting of basic information regarding ownership and transfer prices 
can tilt land markets in favor of developers who specialize in spotting unreported, publicly-owned 
land parcels. Land developers can strike non-competitive (or corrupt) deals with public officials 
to obtain land title or development rights. Transparent public reporting at all stages of land asset 
management should provide a cure to this kind of manipulation, especially if transaction 
information is included. Though reporting requirements for improving transparency of land asset 
management are conceptually clear (see below), a good part of this agenda has yet to be fully 
implemented. Each institution controlling urban public land should be required to disclose and 
publish the following: 
  Public land ownership – The inventory of land parcels, including all of the parcel 
information from agencies’ records.  
  Land valuation – Any information an agency maintains on the estimated value of 
significant land parcels, with a special section on valuations of parcels being considered 
for (i) coming dispositions or contribution to public-private joint ventures or public 
enterprises and (ii) acquisitions by the institution.  
  Disclosure of transaction-based information – What was sold or leased or contributed to 
another entity, to whom, by which method (auction, direct sale, etc.), at what price, or in 
exchange for what. Similar information should be published on property acquisition by 
the institution. It also should periodically publish plans for property disposals and 
advertise each transaction / sale in advance. 
  Balance sheet (if prepared) and budget (both proposed and actual) – The balance sheet 
should show land at value required by the current accounting valuation standards and 19 
 
note which part of legal land holdings is included on the balance sheet. The budget 
should show income from land sales as a revenue source. Institutions that do not produce 
balance sheets for accounting purposes should be encouraged to do so.  Development 
rights, water rights, and other rights attached to land likewise should, in principle, be 
valued and made public.  
Many countries are moving in the direction of more transparent reporting.  For example, local 
governments in the United Kingdom now are required to publish their financial reports and 
balance sheets. They must also report the valuation of asset holdings, and income from property 
assets, based on guidance documents produced by the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors. 
Competitive Land Market Disposition 
One of the most fundamental rules for good land asset management is that all sales of significant 
land parcels should be conducted through transparent means.   Public auctions are one important 
instrument for determining market values, especially in countries where it is difficult to appraise 
market values due to market volatility, lack of appraisal expertise, or risks of corruption.   
Contributions of land to public-private joint ventures should take place only after independent 
professional valuation of parcel values, and through open competition after adequate marketing 
and public advertisement. 
Over the past decade, various developing countries have adopted rules for competitive disposal of 
land under subnational control. The rules are aimed at eliminating abuses, in which government 
land has been transferred at far-below-market prices to favored developers or favored enterprises. 
China, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, and South Africa are among the 
countries that have adopted national regulations requiring that subnational governments use 
auctions for sale of government-owned land.  The increase in prices obtained through competition 
can be striking.  In the case of Egypt, according to newspaper reports, the sale price of broadly 
comparable desert land outside of Cairo designated for new town development increased from 
two Egyptian pounds to 300 pounds per sq meter, when the transfer mechanism was changed 
from privately negotiated sale to public auction (Peterson 2009).  China’s regulatory requirement, 
adopted in 2001, that municipal land-use and development rights be sold via auction has 
transformed the municipal land market and greatly increased local government receipts. 
Following promulgation of national regulations prescribing the use of auctions for land transfers, 
the proportion of parcels whose Land Use Rights actually were sold at auction in Shanghai rose 
from 17 percent in 2001 to 76 percent in 2003 (Chen 2009). 
Experience in many countries has demonstrated that the quality of the auctioning process may be 
as important as auctioning itself.  Otherwise, auctions can be used as window dressing for non-
competitive transfers.
6 Transfers of land assets to governmental subsidiaries or joint ventures are 
often governed by more opaque rules than direct dispositions to the private sector.  For this 
reason, the most recent generation of national regulations has required market-based valuations, 
and competitive procedures, for transfers of property assets between subnational entities, as well 
as between these entities and the private sector.  
                                                 
6 Typical ways of reducing auctions to practically non-competitive transactions include: obscure marketing 
of sites, too-short advertising periods, land use parameters and conditions “tailored” for a specific buyer, 
last-minute changes of auction date/place, leaving an honest winner out of deal by imposing additional 
requirements after the auction, and granting after-auction payment discounts (for example, for expected 
jobs created on the site).     
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Use of Funds: Capital Earmarking 
It is becoming more common for regulations to require that revenue generated by the sale of 
public land or land-use rights be used for capital investment. The United Kingdom requires that 
proceeds from the sale of local public property go into the capital budget, where they can be used 
to finance new investment or finance other expenditures that legally fit within the capital budget. 
In Serbia, revenues from long-term leasing of land-use and development rights must, by national 
law, be earmarked for local utilities and used for utility infrastructure investment. In Ethiopia, 
national law requires that at least 90 percent of proceeds from local governments’ upfront leasing 
of land-use and development rights be used to finance infrastructure investment. How narrowly 
should the fiscal framework restrict subnational spending from land sales? Strict earmarking has 
the disadvantage of removing decentralized governments’ flexibility over budget allocations.   
Among developed countries, Canada has one of the most sophisticated approaches to land 
valuation and land management.  However, its budgetary rules allow the proceeds from land sales 
to be added to a subnational unit’s general budget.   
The principle behind the golden rule holds that one-time revenues from asset sales should be used 
to finance investment, or one-time expenditures similar to investments.  Whether this goal is best 
reached by imposing regulatory restrictions or by granting subnational governments budgetary 
flexibility is best decided within a particular country’s institutional context. 
Financial reporting practices make it difficult to monitor whether subnational governments are 
complying with earmarking rules, when these exist. In cash accounting systems, all revenue goes 
into a single budget, from which expenditures are made. Because all revenues are fungible, it is 
possible to track compliance with capital targeting requirements only through separate notes to 
determine whether capital investment at least meets the threshold of revenue received from land 
sales.   
Land as Collateral for Local Borrowing 
The four countries we examined in detail—Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, and the United 
Kingdom—have no specific restrictions on the use of land or local government property as 
collateral for borrowing.   
China has identified the use of land collateral as a potential systemic risk and put in place 
regulations to limit risk exposure. Land plays a critical part in subnational finance in China.  In 
2008, proceeds from the leasing of land use and development rights accounted for 79.4 percent of 
subnational-controlled own-source revenues (China Ministry of Finance 2009). A significant part 
of the subnational government borrowing is backed, directly or indirectly, by land on the balance 
sheets of subnational governmental units.  The national government therefore has a special 
interest in regulating the exposure of subnational governments to the combined risks of land 
markets and debt.   
Until 2003, it was common practice in China for subnational governments to borrow from banks 
to finance infrastructure projects, using as collateral the projected value of land once the 
infrastructure project was completed. For example, ring roads around major metropolitan areas 
were routinely financed in part by loans secured by adjoining land, whose value would be greatly 
enhanced by ring road construction. The Urban Development Investment Corporations of 
subnational governments were allowed by banks to value land used as loan collateral at the 
expected market value the land would have upon completion of the road project. In addition, 
projects were designed so that the proceeds from the sale of leasing rights to land adjoining the 
ring road would be used to repay construction loans. This practice, while successful in generating 
financing and helping finance China’s massive infrastructure growth, exposed banks to both 21 
 
project completion risk and land-market risk.  To reduce this risk, China in 2003 promulgated 
new rules requiring banks to value land collateral at its current market value rather than at 
projected market value upon works completion. 
Land asset bubbles, i.e., “excessive” increases in land and property prices, have received a great 
deal of attention as a potential source of systemic macroeconomic risk.  Recent worldwide 
experience has made developing countries more sensitive to the potential for land and property 
bubbles.  Land owned by subnational governments has received attention from policymakers, 
especially in countries where a large proportion of urban land is owned by subnational 
authorities.   
All three of the developing countries in our four-country sample impose substantial limitations or 
prohibitions on foreign acquisition of land owned by subnational government entities, motivated 
by concern about the price impacts of international demand.  Beyond these three countries, China 
imposed temporary restrictions on foreign purchases of housing, during the land-price escalation 
of 2007, limiting acquisition to those who had been in the country for a year or more. 
China’s initiatives in 2009-2010 illustrate the variety of policies that are being applied to the 
subnational sector in an effort to avoid a land-price bubble.  The government emphasized the 
challenge of managing the economy through a period of credit expansion at low interest rates—a 
policy necessary to sustain economic growth in the midst of weak worldwide economic 
performance—without triggering asset price bubbles.
7  China has taken a series of policy actions 
to manage the risks of potential land asset bubbles. These actions include tax on resale of 
properties within five year period, placing price limits on subnational land parcels, prohibiting 
banks from lending to developers that hoard land, and restricting state-owned-enterprises from 
competing in municipal land auctions.
8  
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
Land finance has become an important source of capital financing for subnational infrastructure 
investment.  Not only do land transactions generate substantial amounts of revenue, but 
conversion of surplus land into infrastructure can promote urban growth in an economically 
efficient manner.  Using surplus land to pay for capital investment also relieves the pressure on 
subnational governments to tap credit markets for financing, potentially reducing their overall 
risk profile.  Land finance, in short, is a positive opportunity for subnational governments.  Like 
other forms of capital finance, however, it carries risks.  This paper has emphasized fiscal risk 
mitigation.  However, the objective of a subnational fiscal framework should not be to reduce 
land-based financing in the name of risk mitigation.  Rather, it should identify specific risks that 
can be reduced through prudential management, while at the same time encouraging more 
effective utilization of the land-financing option.   
At present, in many developing countries and many developed countries, comprehensive 
information about ownership structure of land at the subnational level is lacking including the 
value of various land assets and how much of which can legitimately be classified as “for sale or 
development,” because it is not required for public service delivery or public amenities.  In most 
countries, information remains to be collected on how much land is being sold, or how important 
the revenues are relative to subnational budgets.  Transparency in other aspects of land finance is 
                                                 
7 See “Report on the Work of Government,” Third Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress, 
Beijing, China, adopted March 14, 2010,  http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
03/15/content_13174348.htm.  People’s Online Daily 2010. 
8 See also Wang (2010). 22 
 
equally important—such as the terms on which public authorities contribute land to public-private 
joint ventures, or what happens to the revenue generated from public land sales. 
It is difficult to design and implement an appropriate fiscal risk management framework without 
accurate information.  An important task therefore is to gather reliable information on land 
finance and the potential risks inherent in current practices.  These will vary by country, 
depending upon the scale of subnational land finance and the transparency of current reporting.  
A priority in integrating land finance into the subnational fiscal framework would be 
establishment of uniform reporting requirements for subnational land ownership, land sales, 
contributions of land to public-private ventures, land transactions between different types of 
subnational institutions, and revenue generated by land sales.  These are the essential building 
blocks needed to translate a priori principles into meaningful fiscal oversight.  One important step 
(adopted by China for example) is to require that land transactions be placed ‘on budget’, so that 
there is full upward reporting to higher-level authorities. 
To capture the full benefit of land sales, and to make informed decisions about whether to dispose 
of public lands to help finance infrastructure investment, subnational governments need to have 
reliable valuations of the principal land parcels they own.  They need to take advantage of the 
competitive market for land development, by selling land via transparent public auction or 
conveying it to joint-venture partners after open competition.  The fiscal framework can support 
this objective by requiring that public lands be sold at auction, and by requiring public disclosure 
of land valuations before deals are struck with private infrastructure developers or other entities. 
Transparency in land transactions can help reduce risks, but it also promotes full realization of the 
potential of land financing. 
Urban land markets are volatile and cyclical.  Extreme dependence on land finance for capital 
investment funding will impart this volatility to subnational capital budgets. The fiscal framework 
should mitigate such risk.  Risk mitigation may take the form of ceilings on land-finance 
dependence (similar to ceilings on local indebtedness) or encouragement of permanent 
infrastructure funds that accumulate proceeds from land sales and spread out expenditures over 
time, according to an infrastructure investment plan. 
The “golden rule” of public finance should be applied to subnational land financing.  Capital 
revenues generated through land sales, like the revenues generated from debt issuance, should be 
used for capital investment or equivalent purposes.  Rules that require revenues from land 
transactions to be dedicated to investment reduce the financial risk that arises when one-time 
revenues are used to finance recurring operating expenditures.  Such rules also open the 
opportunity to diversify and augment own-source financing of capital investment. 
Recent worldwide experience has highlighted the macroeconomic repercussions of land and 
property bubbles.  The extent to which the risks of systemic land-price bubbles overlap with 
subnational fiscal regulation will depend upon each country’s system of land ownership.  At a 
minimum, limits on the use of land collateral for subnational borrowing should be in place, so as 
to avoid compounding the risks inherent in subnational debt with the risks of land-market 
volatility.  In countries where subnational governments are the principal owners of urban land, a 
greater variety of initiatives may be necessary to steer subnational governments away from 
creating market risks that run beyond their regional borders.   
In this paper, we have focused attention on land financing as an element of the subnational fiscal 
framework.  In practice, it is likely that financial and fiscal regulation of land financing will be 
bundled together with rules designed to improve the economic and institutional management of 
subnational land assets.  Steps such as inventorying land assets, assigning valuations to key land 
parcels, and increasing the transparency of land transactions between different governmental 23 
 
institutions or between subnational government and the private sector enhance the efficient 
management of land assets as well as reduce fiscal risks.  When land has been used extensively as 
collateral for bank borrowing, prudential rules for land finance are likely to be adopted in 
coordination with rules for regulating subnational debt. 
The principal pieces of national legislation that were reviewed in preparation of this paper tackle 
subnational fiscal management of land finance in conjunction with broader issues of efficient land 
and property asset management.  These topics are likely to continue to be joined together in 
public policy debate.   Integrating land financing into effective subnational fiscal management, 
however, deserves separate analytical attention, even if it is likely to be bundled together with 
other aspects of subnational property management in national regulation or legislation. 
This paper is a first attempt to identify fiscal risks embedded in land financing based on a cross-
country context. Future research can go further to include more topics. For example, how to 
incorporate land financing into medium-term fiscal framework and capital investment plans given 
that multiple agencies own and manage public land assets?  If land is used as collateral for bank 
borrowing, what are prudential rules for capital reserve ratio? How to develop disclosure and 
reporting standards for fiscal risks from land transactions?   24 
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